What I Saw in North Korea and Why it Matters

What I Saw in North Korea and Why it Matters


>> A group of us here at Google are working to
understand what our policy should be; our position should be on nuclear energy. With
respect to, you know, global warming, climate change, renewable energy and dwindling fossil
fuel supplies, and we’ve been reaching out to various experts to understand the problems
of waste and safety and proliferation. And in a conversation we had several weeks ago
with Sieg Hecker, I learned–I had a dramatic kind of change in perception of what North
Korea was and why they did what they did. And so we invited Sieg to come and share that
with a greater audience. So please welcome, Siegfried Hecker. He’ll tell you about his
visits to North Korea and why countries build atomic bombs. Thank you.
>>HECKER: Thank you very much, Chris. Ladies and gentlemen, both of those of you who are
here and also at the remote Google sites, I welcome you and I thank you for inviting
me to give a Google seminar. As Chris had indicated, I’ve been talking to a number of
the folks from Google about nuclear futures and nuclear energy. And of course, nuclear
energy, it turns out, is the story of promise and peril. And I’ve worked on both of those
aspects for a good part of my professional life. I spent 34 years at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory, the birthplace of the bomb. And I was director of that laboratory for about
a dozen years. And then a little over five years ago I came out to Stanford where I continue
my work on what I call nuclear risk reduction. And that is mostly the worry about the peril
side of nuclear energy. And what I focus on are principally issues of nuclear weapons,
nuclear weapons policy, nuclear proliferation, that is the spread of nuclear weapons around
the world and nuclear terrorism. But of course all of that is intimately connected to nuclear
energy and I was set to give a talk last week which I did at Purdue University which I titled,
“Nuclear Promise and Nuclear Peril.” And of course, what everyone had on their mind with
nuclear peril was Fukushima, Daiichi in Japan. But what I’m going to focus on today is mostly
the issue of proliferation of nuclear weapons and particularly, North Korea. In my discussions
with my colleagues here at Google, I’ve been telling them pieces of the North Korea story
and so they were interested to sort of hear the whole North Korea story. Well, I won’t
tell you the whole North Korea story but I’m going to try to give you my version of North
Korea. The photo that you actually see on here is in Beijing airport of an airplane,
it’s actually an Ilyushin, a Russian aircraft, of my getting ready to go into North Korea,
into Pyongyang. We have to fly in through Beijing and then also fly back out through
Beijing. And what I’m going to talk about today is to give you a sense of the whole
program and that is, you know, how did North Korea get the bomb? What does it actually
have? Why did they get the bomb? What is the threat from the North Korean nuclear program?
And then what do we do now? And then hopefully, if I leave enough time, I will also try to
give you sort of a photo parade of North Korea because I’ve been allowed to take a lot of
photos, and it looks very differently than what you see on American television. So, that’s
what I will do. So, let me start with how did North Korea get the bomb? It began with
the Soviets’ “Atoms for Peace Program”. The Atoms for Peace Program was initiated by President
Eisenhower and the United States in 1953 and the essence was that at that time only the
US, the Russians, and the Brits had nuclear weapons. All of the technology was highly
classified and President Eisenhower said, “We will share nuclear technology with those
countries in the world who are willing to foreswear nuclear weapons, in other words,
not to pursue nuclear weapons but instead develop Atoms for Peace, for civilian purposes.
The Soviets also followed suit and so, as you might imagine since the world was divided
into two, sort of US and Soviet blocs, the Soviets then helped the countries in Eastern
Europe and many of the others including China initially, and including North Korea to develop
peaceful nuclear energy. So, the North Koreans were trained in Soviet universities. They
were trained in Soviet nuclear centers. The Soviets built the first small research reactor
in Yongbyon which is the–still currently the nuclear facility in North Korea. It’s
about 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang. And that was the beginning but it was strictly
meant to help the North Koreans with peaceful applications of atomic energy. However, for
those of you who know much about Korea, they eventually trust no one. They want to go their
own path and they did go their own path in the nuclear arena. And in the 1970s having
learned much, having set up their own nuclear engineering programs, nuclear physics programs
at the university, they decided and laid out a very ambitious program for nuclear reactors
and at the same time, in my opinion, they actually chose a path to the North Korean
nuclear reactor program that would also allow them to develop the option for nuclear weapons
and I will say more about that. And then for a number of very interesting but very complex
political reasons in the early 1990s when the North Korean world first came apart that
was the first time they actually worked directly with the United States in order to take this
nuclear program that they were building up and essentially freeze the bomb component
of that program. The reason they reached across the United States was that, as you remember,
in the end of 1991 the Soviet Union came apart. When that happened here was a very strong
and supportive allay of North Korea. Not only the Soviet Union but the Soviet Bloc and you
find today strong connections from Eastern Europe to North Korea. And the Russians essentially
deserted them overnight and so the financial help, the technical help, everything that
was there beforehand went away. The second major bloc that dealt with North Korea was
China, but this was also a time when China was worried much more about its own economic
rise than it was about the ideology around the world and the Chinese actually hooked
up with the South Koreans because they felt that that was a better way to go economically.
So North Korea at that point felt it really had no friends left and it actually reached
across the United States in order to try to strike a deal. Well, that was difficult to
do but eventually a deal was struck in 1994. The essence of that deal was that the North
Koreans would freeze their plutonium program–and again I’ll tell you more about that. In return
the US would actually make sure the North Koreans get two light water reactors, the
ones that are better for electricity than for bombs and that we would normalize relationships
with them. Well, it turns out that was a rocky marriage from 1994 to 2002, and in 2002 the
marriage came apart because that’s the first time the Bush administration sent representatives
to Pyongyang and instead of sort of holding out the peace branch, they accused the North
Koreans of having cheated on this agreement. North Koreans walked away and in 2002 actually
began bomb production. And then that continued for the rest of the Bush administration and
indeed, along the way, the North Koreans not only were able to extract plutonium from their
reactor products but they actually conducted a first test in 2006 and a second test in
May of 2009. So, the North Korean nuclear story is a story of 50 years in the making.
It’s not something that you do overnight. It’s 50 years in the making and it vacillated
back and forth as to whether it was more civilian or a more defense, and I’ve written a paper
on this subject published in the journal Daedalus in the winter of 2010 which actually looks
at the simple connectivity between technical capability and between political intent. So,
let me just give premiere on the bomb because in order for you to appreciate what plutonium
means, what highly enriched uranium means, you need at least to know these essentials
and if I insult, you know, some of your technical–sorry–but I thought I should give you that as background.
There are essentially two paths to the bomb and if you look at the periodic table, the
two practical fissile materials are uranium and actually only one isotope of uranium,
that is 235 that occurs only seven tenths of a percent of natural uranium, and the other
one being plutonium which is principally man-made from reactors. And so the two paths are–let’s
look at the right hand side first. And that is, you take the natural fissile material,
uranium-235, and you essentially throw away all of the rest of what you’ve find in mother
nature, that is the 238 isotope of uranium. You do that by a process called enrichment,
essentially just concentrating one isotope. As you might imagine, that’s somewhat difficult
to do because they’re both uranium, they both have the same chemical properties, in essence.
So you have to take advantage of one being just a little heavier than the other. And
that’s what you do in a centrifuge. So you turn the uranium into a gas, you spin it very,
very fast. The light stuff stays on the inside. The heavy stuff goes to the outside. And you
just go through in this over and over and over and that’s where the term centrifuges
cascades come from. And so, that was what was done. Actually doing the Manhattan project
days in the United States, we did it by a different technique called gaseous diffusion,
but today the technique of choice is the centrifuge. And what you see on the right hand side are
just rows of these centrifuges. The second path to the bomb is you actually start with
the natural uranium or slightly enriched uranium and you put it in the reactor and you start
the neutron reaction, and you fission the uranium-235 atoms that makes a bunch of fission
products, and it makes a bunch of neutrons; 238 picks up a neutron and through a few decays
becomes plutonium. And it turns out that plutonium is even a better bomb material than uranium-235,
except now you not only have to make it in the reactor, which is the top diagram on your
left hand side but then you have to extract it from the reactor products, from the fission
products. And that you do chemically and that’s what we call reprocessing it. You do that
in a reprocessing facility. Now, it turns out for the uranium-235, you can make a rather
simple bomb. And that is you just take two sub-critical hemispheres and you put them
in a gun and you shoot them together very rapidly. Okay, when you do that, in essence,
if you do it right, that was the Hiroshima device, about 13 or so kilotons, 13,000 ton
TNT equivalent. It destroyed a city. One plane, one bomb, destroyed a city. That’s because
of this nucleus stuff. When you split the nucleus, you get a factor of millions in the
energy gain compared to all the other chemical techniques. And so that’s why nuclear is so
special. And not only do you get that in nuclear energy but also you’re also get it in the
bomb if you do it right, or if you do it wrong, depending on your point of view. So this gun
assembly works for highly enriched uranium, for a bomb that’s typically 80 to 90% enriched.
It doesn’t work for plutonium for very good nuclear physics reasons I won’t get into.
So for plutonium instead, you have to use what we call the implosion device. And that
is, you have a sub-critical mass of plutonium, pack explosives around it like a [INDISTINCT],
you put detonators around and you try to implode it all very symmetrically, drive it to super-criticality
and then it blows up, that’s Nagasaki. It takes about six kilograms for the implosion
device of plutonium, takes a few tens of kilograms for–in highly enriched plutonium. You can
also use the implosion device with highly–use highly enriched uranium in the implosion device
but in much simpler way to go, and this would be the nuclear terrorism lecture, would be
to use this gun assembly. So, most countries that have nuclear weapons today actually pursue
both of these. And in the United States, we did that in the Manhattan project. Okay, so
that is the premier then let me just say that North Korea has mastered the entire plutonium
fuel cycle. Fuel cycle, meaning everything from the time you dig it out of the ground,
you mine it–and by the way, they have significant quantities of uranium ore in North Korea,
none in South Korea but quite a bit in North Korea. So, they know how to mine it, mill
it, convert it and then make fuel. The type of reactors that they chose to build that
are called gas-cooled graphite moderated reactors. They’re patterned after the one’s that the
Brits build in the early 1950s, the first one of which was Calder Hall reactor. Turns
out the benefits of this type of reactor is you can feed in natural uranium. You don’t
have to enrich it a little bit first as you do with light water reactors. So that means
the North Koreans, since they did this on their own, I mean they copied the Calder Hall
reactor but they did it strictly on their own with no more help at that time from the
Soviets, from the Chinese, from nobody. And so, they didn’t need enrichment, they were
able to make their own fuel, used metallic fuel for these reactors instead of ceramic
fuels because you need a higher uranium density since all you have is seven tenths of a percent
of the fissile isotope. And so, they know how to make fuel. Second, they built reactors.
They finished one, the small one, five mega-watt electric. That’s very small. It doesn’t produce
much electricity but it produces one bomb’s worth of plutonium a year if you can extract
it. And so, that–they’ve had that reactor operating since 1986, off and on over the
years. They had a 50-megawatt within one or two years of completion when they signed this
agreement with the Americans in 1994, that was then halted. Now to tell you, later through
my visits, I found out its dead. It can’t be resurrected. They had a 200-megawatt electric
reactor that actually would have produced quite a bit of electricity for North Korea.
That was just in the beginning stages of construction. They halted that. That’s also not salvageable
today. The back-end, the reprocessing facility, it’s just a complicated chemical engineering
facility where you deal with all of this hot nucleus stuff that you’ve heard about related
to Japan except, in this type of facility you handle it in hot cells with remote handling
where that radioactivity is essentially separated from the workers. They know how to that. They
patterned that facility after a facility in Belgium. Again, they built it by themselves.
North Koreans are terrific engineers. They built this whole complex then by themselves.
So, that’s the Yongbyon nuclear complex. So, what do they have? It’s sort of the bottom
line slide. On the basis of my visits and my discussions with the North Koreans, and
on the basis of looking with Google earth as to whether that there’s a plume coming
out of the cooling tower of the Yongyon reactor, we pretty much know how many days it’s operated.
We can estimate what power level they operate at and we know what sort of reactor they have,
what fuel they put in, and you can calculate how much plutonium they’ve made. So this is
actually the part we know the best. And then some of the holes they filled-in in my personal
discussions with them. So they have to date, 24 to 42 kilograms sort of four to eight bombs
worth. So–and they indeed do have the bomb because they exploded two of them, one didn’t
work so well. The second one, as far as I’m concerned was successful. Now, my view is,
that that–since they’ve had have let’s say, one and a half test, the bombs that they have
are most likely primitive bombs. In other words like our Nagasaki bomb which had delivered,
you know, it was huge 10,000 pounds, had to be delivered by a plane. It’s very difficult
to miniaturize these things and it takes nuclear testing, it takes computational capability
and I just don’t believe they’ve had the opportunity to get there yet. Now, they have no plutonium
in the pipeline even though they could still run that reactor, they’ve chosen not to run
their reactor. It’s an interesting part of the North Korean story. They shut it down
the last time in July of 2007. They’ve not restarted it. However, they could–again based
on my visits, it would take about six months to get their reactor up and operating. And
the reprocessing facility, it’s in cold stand-by–it’s in stand by but they could operate it also.
Now, uranium enrichment, we’ve suspected them of doing uranium enrichment over decades but
we never really had the smoking gun. And that was the story of my last visit in November
of 2010. They finally decided to show me what they’ve done in uranium enrichment. Quite
frankly, I was expecting not much, sort of a couple of dozens centrifuges, maybe in a
garage or somewhere, and instead, I’ll show you that they now have a small industrial
scale centrifuge facility. And I’ll tell you what it’s for. And then I’ll also tell you
what the potential problems are. I mentioned that here, is even though they’ve built this
current facility that I saw to make low-enriched uranium, that stuff that goes into light water
reactors, sort of 3 to 5% enriched in the isotope 235 instead of 80 to 90 which is what
you–they use for bombs. And so, we don’t know about the highly-enriched uranium weapons
because this is a new twist that we simply didn’t expect for them to have come this far.
Will there be another nuclear test? When we were just working in the plutonium world,
I thought maybe one more. But as you can see with that much plutonium, if they would do
six tests we’d be finished. You know, the problem would be solved. I thought they might
do one more. Now, if they make highly-enriched uranium, we may see highly enriched uranium
test. So, we’re not sure. So, how would we know all this stuff? It helped that shows
up okay, that you can at least see photos from my six first trips to North Korea, I’ve
taken seven all together. In 2003–and what’s really interesting in working with the North
Koreans, is you might imagine they only let me in if they feel I can do them some good.
I mean, because otherwise, why let me in into their nuclear facilities. So, for each of
these visits, they’ve had a very special message. Now, you might wonder how I get to go to North
Korea. Well, I don’t go as a U.S. government official, it’s what we call track two diplomacy,
non-official, non-governmental. I worked for Los Alamos for 34 years but one of the beauties
of working for Los Alamos; I was actually an employee at the University of California
because it run the laboratory for the government. So, I was never a government employee. But
the North Koreans know I have good link to the U.S. government. I mean, that’s what they
want to use. So, they sent me a message with each of these visits. The first one and the
last one were the most fascinating one. The first one–I actually show a picture, so you’ve
heard about spent fuel pools at Fukushima Daiichi, I’m sure. This is the spent fuel
pool and we’re looking down into this spent fuel pool in Yongbyon because they were trying
to tell me that the fuel rod that used to be stored in there that held the plutonium
that’s been sitting there for eight years is now gone. And they’ve extracted the plutonium.
Wasn’t quite that easy to figure out but the bottom line was one, when they showed me their
reprocessing facility, they sat me down in the conference room then they said, “Well,
Dr. Hecker, we’ve now shown you our deterrent.” And I said, “Deterrent? Hey, wait a minute,”
you know, “I mean, you showed me the reactor reprocessing facility. It looks like the fuel
rods are gone,” you know, “you have them, but,” you know, “I haven’t seen anything.”
They said, “Well, how would you like to see our product?” And I’m in the conference room
now, right? And I said, “You mean the plutonium?” And they said, “Well, yes.” I said, “Well,
I’ve worked at Los Alamos for 34 years. Yes, sure bring it in.” So, they did into the conference
room. A metal box about this big and I opened it up. They opened it up. Inside was a white
wooden box. They slid off the top and there sat two jars, two marmalade jars, believe
it or not. Screw on tops and inside was a plutonium powder and the other one had plutonium
metal. They said that’s our product. So, I finally wound up–I didn’t have any detectors.
I had nothing with me because I figured I’d never get in if I bring anything. So, I had
my eyes and finally I asked them if I could hold it? Because plutonium’s very heavy. The
density of unalloyed plutonium is 20 grams per cc and it should also be slightly warm
because it is radioactive. And when I tell my students that story, you know, they all
say, “Oh my God,” you know, “you held a plutonium. How come you’re still alive?” Well, for those–I’m
sure you know, the plutonium is only alpha reactive. And so as long as you have it in
the plastic bag or in a jar or whatever, it doesn’t get you. You don’t want to breathe
it or inhale it–I mean, inhale it or digest it. And so, the plutonium was okay. And it
was plutonium. And so, each one of these visits they had a certain message that they wanted
to get across. And over these seven years, I’ve been able to visit their nuclear facilities
four times, talk to their nuclear people especially in each of those visits, and get a reasonably
good sense of what they have in the–in their plutonium program. That was the story in 2004.
In 2007, what you see here is actually a glove box and I’m in the middle of that crew, on
the lower left. I do actually see where they made the plutonium and that was fascinating.
I learned a lot just from going through the plutonium laboratory. The one on the right,
they actually showed that they had disabled most of their plutonium facilities in 2008
which they did. And then we come to visit number seven which was just this last November.
And when I arrived there they said, “We will convert this center, you know, from a plutonium
facility to a light water reactor and pylon enrichment facility.” So, that’s what we’re
doing. And they also reminded me. They said, “You know, we said that in 2009 after–again,
they had an altercation this time with the Obama administration, they walked away from
everything again from these six party talks, the four neighbors, North Korea and the US,
and they said, “We’re going to do our own light water reactor. And that of course means
we have to actually do uranium enrichment because that’s what you need for light water
reactor fuel.” And they said, “Nobody believed us including you Dr. Hecker. And so, we’re
going to show you.” So, they did. So they first took me on the left hand side. The arrow
points to where they were just beginning the construction of the light water reactor. On
the right hand side, the building with a blue roof, which interestingly enough no one had
picked up until that time. It was only after I told people I was in this building that
then–when they looked down with digital globe, and they saw this blue roof, I said, “Yes,
that’s the one. That’s where I was and that’s where the uranium enrichment was being done.”
So with the light water reactor, particularly in light of what happened now in Japan, and
I wrote these all before Japan ever happened, I’ve published several papers on my visit
to North Korea, what I found and what concerns me. And this was one of my biggest concerns.
When I saw how they were constructing that small–it’s a small light water reactor, experimental
light water reactor; it would not meet U.S. or Western safety standards. The way that
they were constructing this concrete containment shell with a small concrete mixer, you know,
in the winter time, it’s just not the way to construct the reactor. They also did it
with the whole new reactor design team. It’s tough to forge that stainless steel. It’s
even tougher to go ahead and weld it in place. They did weld with their old reactor but this
is very different. It’s a different technology. And what I used to say, the western world
learned, in fact the whole world learned from the examples of Three Mile Island and then
Chernobyl. And nuclear power operators around the world got together and said, “Look, we
have to run these things safely because otherwise we will have no nuclear power.” And they did.
They had a fantastic safety record for all those years. Then of course, Fukushima Daiichi
happened, you know, where a national catastrophe was much beyond anything that the system was
designed for. And the one thing, at least, that I’ve learned from that and that lessons
learned will yet to be drawn because, of course, the situation is not yet completely stabilized.
But one of the lessons is, for sure, you have to have technical expertise in-country. You
know, both the authorities and the technical people have to know what they’re doing in
terms of emergency response. You have to have the right equipment available. You know, I’m
sure you followed that, you know, with the fire trucks, the hoses, the sea-salt spraying
and all of these things. Well, let me–I want to give you examples of North Korean preparedness
for natural disasters and it doesn’t give you a lot of faith. So, I was mostly concerned
about the safety their reactor and I made this view-graph long before Japan. One can
also be concerned that this light water reactor could make plutonium. But it turns out it
wouldn’t make any sense to make plutonium that way because they already have their reactor
that makes good bomb-grade plutonium. Light water reactors make bad bomb-grade plutonium.
And of course, what they now have is they can say, “Look, we have a light water reactor.
We need to enrich because that’s what we need to do for nuclear energy.” And so, that’s
what they say. This is a photo I took in August of 2007, as we were leaving Yongbyon after
the rain, torrential rains all day long, and if you look carefully, what you see is on
the other side of the river, there’s a whole parade of people, from children to adults
that are carrying rocks and sand in dishpans up to the road to throw it on the roads so
that we could get back out of there and back to Pyongyang. That was their Emergency Relief
and Disaster Management. And it turns out they lost several hundred people in North
Korea during that flood. They have about 50 centimeters of rain in various parts of the
country. They lost 10% of their crops in essence, because they don’t have much in terms of Emergency
Relief and Disaster Management. Okay, now just to give you a little bit of what was
associated with this uranium enrichment. Since it was a big surprise, in the middle on the
right hand side is Ambassador Ligon [ph], the second in-charge of the six party talks.
And he said, “Dr. Hecker, you will have very big news when you go to Yongbyon.” I still
didn’t know what it was. The big news was something like this, and I had to make this
up because they wouldn’t let me take any photos this time. This is a slightly doctored photo
from one of the US Centrifuge Plants, but that’s in essence what a centrifuge facility
looked like. It was truly mind boggling. In about 2,000 centrifuges I looked up from the
second floor of an observation window and it just these beautiful rows of centrifuges,
three of them in pairs. And not only that, but the whole facility looked totally different
than all the other facilities at Yongbyon. The other facilities looked sort of Soviet
50s or 60s style. And just to give you an example, on the lower right, is the reactor
control room that I visited several times, sort of Soviet style. And what you see on
the upper left is actually, you know, computers flat screens. This was in Kim Il-sung University
e-Library. And the control room of this centrifuge facility looked like that, not like the old
control rooms. So, it had four computers, flat panel monitors, LED displays. It was
just ultra modern. I’ve never seen anything like that in North Korea. Okay, so the centrifuge
facility–I’ll just go through this very quickly because I’m sure most of you are not interested
in the details. But they did have 2,000 centrifuges and it looked like they have, what we call
P-2s, sort of a second generation of centrifuges. It turns out the faster you spin these centrifuges,
the more separation that you get. And so you have to use very high strength materials so
they don’t come up apart. The first generation was aluminum; the second generation is what
we call maraging steel. The third generation would actually be carbon composites. So they
are through put, is 8,000 kilograms separative work units per year. What does that mean?
It would mean they have enough capacity to make the low enriched uranium fuel reactor.
The problem is, as I’ll point out in just a minute, it’s also enough to make one bombs
worth of highly enriched uranium if they plummet that way. And they had previously told me
over and over, they don’t have a uranium enrichment program. But they do. So in American diplomatic
circles, you know, what you saw–as soon as I came back, the word was, “See? They lied.”
My answer was, “Well of course, they lied.” I mean they’ve lied many times, you know.
And many countries lie of course in that whole messy diplomatic process, but those diplomats
in the US that I actually worked with them that had specifically heard, “We don’t have
uranium enrichment.” Well, they do. For those of us in the proliferation business, the most
interesting aspect is, “How did they get it?” Because unlike for their reactors where I
told you they made them indigenously, essentially they had all the materials that they needed.
For the enrichment, they do not have all the materials. They do not have all the components,
and we believe they still cannot make those today. So they had to purchase them from somewhere.
And they did. But it turns out they were plenty of greedy European businessmen who were willing
to sell them things. And the Germans tried to sell them aluminum alloys. The Russians
did sell them aluminum alloys. We don’t know where they got the maraging steel, most likely
from the Russians. Again, not through legal, necessarily legal part but they got them.
Where did they get the frequency inverters? Where did they get the bearings? Where did
they get many of the other components? Well, the same place that A.Q. Khan, the father
of the Pakistani bomb got them from all over the world through a very complicated procurement
ring. It looks like the North Koreans have run a very similar ring. And in fact, A.Q.
Khan themselves actually helped out the North Koreans. We know that because President Musharraf
in his memoir actually said he gave them the starter kit. It was that starter kit that
I was expecting to see but instead, much like the North Koreans have done with everything
else, they take whatever they can get and they build things themselves and they do it
quiet well. There’s also–I used to be concerned about possible cooperation with Iran. But,
from what I saw, North Korea is ahead of the Iranian centrifuge program. The Iranians have
played with centrifuges since 1987 and they still don’t have the separative work capacity
that the North Koreans did. This is just to show you that what the North Koreans told
me is that, “Oh yes, of course we have uranium enrichment now. We just started this program
last year.” And it turns out that’s just not possible. You know, it takes years, and years,
and years. And they most likely, they’ve been have been added for decades. But the building
that they putted in and I’ve got this split photo, the one with the blue roof is up now
and it looked like where you see it before where I showed the fuel rod fab facility.
That’s the building I was in a couple of years ago and it didn’t look anything like this.
So they guttedd it, moved it in, but what it means is they had a centrifuge facility
operating some place else. And then they duplicated it and moved it in here within the last year’s
time. So what’s the threat from the centrifuge program? Itself, it’s required for LWRs so
they actually have a good story, you know, “We tried to get an LWR from you, the Americans.
You won’t give it to us; we decided to make our own. And if we make an LWR, we now need
to enrich. And so we did.” Well, but the problem is, the same technology also then can be used
to make highly enriched uranium. And that’s the Iran problem. That’s in essence Iran has
justified its program since it was discovered in 2002, that they need to do it for their
own light water reactor program. The problem is that we also suspect them of being capable
to go to highly enriched uranium. So these 2,000 centrifuges could make enough reactor
fuel or they could make 40 kilograms of 90% enriched. Now, let’s also look for the most
part, you know, we hear in the United States that all of our diplomatic attempts with North
Korea has been totally unsuccessful. It turns out I don’t agree with that because if we
would have left the North Koreans alone in the early 1990s, continue on their path to
build all three of those reactors that I showed you, think of it a couple hundred bombs today,
not a handful. That’s a huge, huge difference. So, what did they not get? They never finished
those bigger reactors. They could have a 100 plus weapons and they wanted electricity and
they got essentially nothing. If you add up all the electricity since 1986 to today, they
produce by nuclear power, its 23 days worth of an LWR equivalent. So, you could say, if
you look at these two North Korean glasses, you know we work with these Americans and
we got nothing. Now we did get a handful of bombs and of course for the regime, that’s
all for the important. So why did they get the bomb? Why do countries get the bomb? It’s
usually three reasons for security, domestic reasons, and international reasons. Security,
no question is driving force. You know we’re still at war technically with North Korea.
The war was only stopped by an armistice in 1953. We have no peace treaty. And every visit
that I’ve had, you know, I’m reminded of the hostile policies of the United States toward
North Korea. And so when they explained “why we had to get the bomb?”, of course, you know
it’s easy for them to say, “It’s your fault. It’s the Americans fault. Your hostile policy,
we feel threatened by you.” And of course, they have a few things to point to, you know,
like Saddam Hussein for example, and the lessons for them was, you know, “He didn’t have a
bomb and he’s gone.” There was a very interesting newspaper blurb from the North Koreans referring
to the Gaddafi situation in Libya. Essentially saying “he shouldn’t have given up this nuclear
stuff in 2003”. Look what’s happening to him now. So at any rate, of course they turn these
things, you know, in the direction that the regime wants them to be. The domestic reasons,
once they got the bomb, then of course for domestic reasons, you know, these people in
North Korea, if you compare them to South Korea, I mean, they really are destitute.
And so they have to sacrifice in their daily lives. They’re reminded daily they have to
sacrifice. Well, if you have an enemy and if you’re going to build a nuclear weapon
to keep that enemy out, so that justifies the sacrifice. And then internationally, that
bomb has bought them an enormous–that handful of bombs, you know, they’re not much of a
nuclear arsenal but it has kept the US out and it does bring the US, you know, to and
the rest to the bargaining table. So it’s used as a bargaining chip. So, now, we know
they have the bomb. We know they have some uranium enrichment. So what does it really
mean? I personally, don’t lose a lot of sleep over the fact that they have the bomb. They’ve
have it at least since 2003. They haven’t done anything crazy with those bombs. From
their standpoint, it’s a deterrent to keep the United States out. So the threat from
those handfuls of bombs, I think, currently is low. If they use the bomb it’s all over.
I mean, the one thing their regime wants is regime preservation and they know that if
they use the bomb anywhere, anytime, it’s the end of the regime. So, why would they
want to use it? Now, if they have a lot more bombs, then I start worrying more. And particularly
so if so they would be able to make a lot of highly enriched uranium which I think they
are not currently able to do, that is, to make a lot, so if they have a hundred bombs,
I’m more concerned. But miscalculations or accidents can certainly happen. When you play
with bombs accidents can happen of course, as we find out in many areas. Uranium enrichment,
I used to not be worried about it. Now I worry about it, if they have the capacity to make
a lot of highly enriched uranium. What I worry mostly about from North Korea is export. In
other words, you know, there’s one threat of having this nuclear stuff in the hands
of the government. It’s much worse yet if it gets out of the hands of the government,
into the hands of Iran, into the hands of terrorists. And so, we know that the North
Koreans sell missile technology all over the world, particularly the countries that we’re
not terribly fond of. We also have examples where they have sold nuclear technologies.
I’m going to give you a one example of that. But it’s sort of difficult to do plutonium
export. They build the reactors although they did one in Syria. It would be much easier
to do highly enriched uranium technology or perhaps to sell highly enriched uranium because
you could use the justification: use highly enriched uranium in research reactors. And
so, it’s actually a civilian export, not a bomb export. So, this was the situation of
North Korea. Let me first say, of this concrete box appearing in the Syrian Desert, it doesn’t
look like much. Although one of my–one of my Los Alamos colleagues, uses SketchUp 6,
and he does beautiful things with all of these aerials and he reconstructs what was actually
in that building. But the Israelis suspected that to be a reactor and they have good reasons
to suspect it. They bombed the reactor and I’ll show you a picture of that, one of the
few you can get on open source with Google Earth, and then it turns out the Syrians cleaned
it up because the Syrians of course, have denied that that was a reactor and they cleaned
it up so fast and they still haven’t allowed the international inspectors full access.
But this thing was a reactor. The reactor is on the left, that’s the concrete box; on
the right is actually what it looked like after the Israelis bombed it. And when you
analyze that closely, it turns out all of the dimensions are just right. It looks just
like the North Korean reactor. The Israelis also got a hold of somebody’s laptop and showed
this reactor under construction before it became the concrete box, and it’s clearly
I guess, graphite reactor patterned just like the North Korean. And so there’s very little
questions that the North Korean built this reactor for the Syrians. We still don’t know
why exactly the Syrians wanted it. Who the customer was? It’s another great proliferation
puzzle. What I thought you’d get a kick out of, and again, my colleague at Los Alamos
does these beautiful things, a combination of Google Earth, Wikis, blogs, Facebooks,
everything, and he pulls photos from everywhere together and then makes stories. And one of
the neat stories is–remember this concrete box? That’s the box on the lower left. The
other three pictures, three photo–three photographs that tourists took of Byzantine fortresses
in the area. And even though the scale is somewhat different, you look at that similarity
and you say, “Now, we understood why they built something like that.” There was no anti-aircraft
around that reactor. There were no big fences. There was nothing. It just sat out there and
they specifically wanted to make sure, which is sort of blend it into the country side.
But when they put the pipes, the water pipes down the Euphrates River, that’s when the
Israelis said, “Okay. Now, we think,” you know, “they’re going to pipe up water.” And
it was wiped out. So, we worry about the North Koreans doing more in nuclear technologies
with other countries. So, will they give up the bomb? In my opinion, not in the near future
because it’s their ticket for regime survival, and unless we’re willing to take military
action which we’re not; we can’t force it to give it up. We’ve tried to squeeze North
Korea but it turns out China doesn’t want to squeeze North Korea. They have a very different
relationship, not that the Chinese like the North Koreans having bombs. You know, they
prefer the North Koreans not to have bombs but they are not willing to have the regime
come to its knees in order for them to give up the bomb. And that’s where we stand today.
So without the Chinese, you can’t force them to give up the bomb. So, what you have to
do is, for the time being, unfortunately, we have to live with it. So, we should make
sure that we reduce the risks and then develop a comprehensive solution. So, we have to deal
with North Korea the way it is, not the way we’d like it to be. We got to work with China
particularly but also of course with South Korea because in the end, you know, that’s
the same people. It’s the same country. But we’ve got to contain the threat even though
eventually we’d like a denuclearized Korean peninsula. So, what I’ve been trying to sort
of market in Washington is, to me, what makes the most sense is what I call three nos with
one yes. The way to reduce the risk is no more bombs, no better bombs, no export. If
we could get the North Koreans to agree on that and particularly get the Chinese to agree
to put the squeeze on the North Koreans, not at this point to give up the bomb but at least
to stop increasing the threat. The “no better bombs” means no testing. So again, if you
look with Google Earth, you know, you can see that they are preparing a third test site.
You know, the holes there, we don’t know exactly when they are going to do it or what they’re
going to do but we’d rather not have them do that test. And so, no test, no more bombs.
They already not producing more plutonium. Now we’d have to make sure they’re not producing
more highly enriched uranium. The one yes, it is–you know, it’s the insecurity that
drives them. And so this whole issue of normalization of relations, what actually needs to be done,
and there’s no single piece of paper you can sign with the North Korean. This is a process
that’s going to take a number of years. Okay. So, now quiz if I may. I may be able to run
through five minutes of just a photo tour through North Korea. Of course, it’s not–it’s
important because we see such a different view on U.S. television today, but it’s also
important that if you cannot try to solve the nuclear issue, you know, we techies always
think the solution is technical. But the solution here isn’t technical. The technology has to
inform the policy that you have to understand the people, you have to understand the history,
you have to understand the culture in order to understand the politics, to understand
whether there is any chance of coming to a resolution. So I focus on the people, and
of course in North Korea the people starts with the Kim family. And particularly here,
the third son Kim Jong-un–and so, everything that we see revolves around the Kim family.
But on the right hand side, here’s another family, just an ordinary Pyongyang family.
Now Pyongyang of course is much better off than most of the rest of the country. But
it’s a mother taking her three little kids probably to kindergarten. So, they are real
people. Kim Jong-un, you know, he’s being prepared–a lot of people have said he’s being
moved into the leadership. That’s not true. He is being prepared for the leadership of
North Korea in a very clever fashion I think, by his father. In the middle, you see the
trio, you know, from Kim Il-Sung to Kim Jung-il to Kim Jong-un. Before last September of 2009–of
let’s see, September of 2010, we essentially knew nothing about Kim Jong-un. And of course,
in terms of people and incidents, we also hear–you know, in March of 26, it turns out
2010, when we thought we might be able to reach some sort of accommodations again with
North Koreans; they apparently sank a South Korean ship, this Cheonan. Things went back
into a crisis once again and then we were emerging from that crisis when the North Koreans
again allowed a number of these track 2 visits including my own in November of last year.
And then two days after I made my findings public, then we had the shelling of Yeonpyeong
Island. And again, trying to understand what exactly was happening and what do these things
have to do with how the politics are playing out internally within North Korea and the
politics between the North and the South. I won’t spend any time on those but just to,
you know, to remind you that the threats are still there and certainly the rhetoric is
there of the North Korean army saying that they are ready to launch a sacred war of justice
of Korean style based on the nuclear deterrent. That’s what we must avoid. So for that, let’s
look at the people. This is what we typically see and it’s true. North Korea is a repressive
state led by a repressive government. They have death camps, force labor camps, torture
facilities. Those exist in North Korea. But what also exist are real people. And I go
visit typically with the embassies of different countries–and by the way North Korea, you
know, it’s called the Hermit Kingdom, the most isolated state in the whole wide world.
They have diplomatic relations with 144 countries around the world. I’ve run into a single German
woman tourist in North Korea, you know, just going there to be a tourist. I’ve run into
Italian tourist. I stopped at the embassies of Sweden, Poland, Czech Republic, etcetera
in North Korea. This is a letter that was sent to me by one of the Swiss workers and
I thought it was interesting, you know, because she says, “Look, like does remain difficult.”
And she says, you know, “They are tight-lipped. They sort of have three compartments in their
heads, one for the party, one for survival strategy, and one for his or her very own
thoughts.” And she said, you know, “I often feel the certain heaviness out in the countryside
but at the same time pride, toughness, and a dose of nationalism that’s there among the
people.” So in the most part the people have figured out how to live within that system
and how to get on with life in spite of the fact that life isn’t very pretty, especially
compared to South Korea. So she says, you know, “What a life? When will you get better?”
Okay, now for the photo tour. You know, these are real people. And it’s important to take
a look at those young ladies. You know, they are so cute. They are real people, you know,
and they’re going to grow up someday and they’re going to live in North Korea and we hope they
live in a better place. Look at this young lady, there are kiosk all over North Korea
now, particularly in Pyongyang but I didn’t saw them out in the countryside where they
actually do have food. The students, it’s always a pleasure to go visit their schools.
They’re doing a physics experiment here. And this young lady right here was writing an
essay on Thomas Alva Edison. Okay? This is North Korea and she’s writing an essay on
Thomas Alva Edison. Computers, dance, we went to the school of Foreign Studies on February,
it was colder inside the building than outside the building. But nevertheless, they were
studying–studying English. Life goes on in Pyongyang of course, particularly people tell
you, you know, there are no people there, there are no cars, there are no traffic but
there are some. There are signs of market activity all over North Korea. And the market
has gone up and down over the years because as soon as they become successful, then the
government becomes scared and tries to shut them down. As soon as it shuts them down the
people try to figure out, you know, where they can actually get something so they build
them back and so it sort of oscillates over time. The Chinese–what the Chinese would
really like to do, they say, “Look, why don’t you do what we did 30 years ago?” You know,
and sort of, let–let the strings out on the free market. But the North Korean regime is
much too scared of that so it’s very careful. Arirang is this fantastic gymnastic dance
performance, a hundred thousand performers in what they call their May Day Stadium. I
already showed you this of the unpreparedness for disaster. This last, was with Kimchi time.
For those of you who know Koreans, you know Kimchi is very important–there was cabbage
everywhere. It was time to actually take care and pick all the cabbage. They’re very determined
people. Again, if you think they can’t do anything because of what we see on television,
if they want to build a university of music, they’ll build a university of music and they
did. In just a few years time and I was inside it, it’s just actually spectacular. So, where
the regime wants to put its money it can get things done. That’s the concert hall of a
concert I attended. Again, North Korea being cut-off, I celebrated the 92nd anniversary
of the Independence of Poland in Pyongyang last November. They have two Polish artists
and then they had this young Korean lady playing Chopin and it was absolutely beautiful, just
beautiful. They have factories, you know, we say they can’t do anything. I’m a meddler
just by training. This was a great wire factory. They have textile factories and interestingly
enough, we got there and we thought we heard American rock music, you know, which we didn’t
quiet believe our ears. So when we asked our guide told us, “Well, we asked the women what
they wanted to hear and they said American rock music.” So that’s what they were playing.
They have very fancy textile machines. These are from Germany. Lots of activity. This is
a tree farm. Kim Jong-Il goes out and he does this on the spot site visits. And then most
have gone out, they told me that there were hills there and he said, “Let there be apple
trees.” And indeed, two years later, there are two million apple trees from Italy. They
actually came and helped them plant those and they were already productive in their
first year, very impressive site. Swimming pools, Kim Il-sung University. This is a fancy
and Olympic size swimming pool as I’ve ever seen. As you can you tell I wasn’t dressed
quite right. But, not only the pool but water slides and if the waters slides aren’t good
enough and he’s massaging. This is Kim Il-sung University, you know, very prestigious university,
obviously for the high-end of the political spectrum for North Korea. But they tell me
10,000 students were trained here at Kim Il-sung University and take advantage of their e-library.
And actually, in this case, my colleague John Lewis was the guy who took me to North Korea
in the first place, looked to say, “Is that really an HP soft touch screen?” And it was.
And here they were in foreign studies and they actually had these students speak and
debate each other while we were there. And it was amazing. Every child in North Korea
has to take English from the third grade on and by the time they got here in this University
of Foreign Studies, they spoke very good American English actually, not British English. So
what does the future hold as I’m drawing to an end? You know, that’s Seoul and a market
in Seoul. And obviously, do have such an enormous disparity across, you know, one line, one
political demarcation can’t hold out forever. People tell you there are no lights. You know,
one of the favorite Google Earths is a–Vice President Cheney used to show the darkness
in North Korea and the lit-up in South Korea. There are more lights. Times are changing.
Some of their buildings are actually lit at night. There’s also this hotel that they build
some 27 years ago. It was a concrete structure shown on the left, never finished, 104 stories,
but two years ago, they started putting glass on. They–an Egyptian Company that was finishing
it up and this last November it was actually done, and is one impressive, impressive building.
So again, if you look at this from a North Korean standpoint, to look up in the city
and see this impressive thing actually, you know, some progress seems to be happening.
Then additionally, they tell you there’s no traffic. There’s not only traffic, there’s
some taxi service. And if you could see this and look closely, that taxi is a Ford Focus
Taxi. Okay? This is in Pyongyang, North Korea. And then we finally started seeing some phone
booths, not the Clark Kent sort of phone booths but at least some phone booths in 2009. And
so we said, you know, things are starting to change. But the real coup de grace came
on this visit and hopefully you can see this on a diagram and it’s a young lady talking
on a cell phone and the same on the lower right hand, the person talking in a cell phone,
it turns out since two years ago, there are now 350,000 cell phones in North Korea. They
have three separate services, it’s all run by the Egyptians also. Egyptians and North
Koreans are very good friends. And so eventually, that would catch up with them. Now, I’ll show
you for the last end, again because of the nature of the lighting in here. I’m not sure
how well it will show up. But, every now and then, you catch a picture like that and here’s
one I caught in Pyongyang Subway. I was coming out and walking down; there was a young man
with a light base jacket, it was November, had the red bandana for the revolution. Everything
looked normal except until I looked at his head. And that, ladies and gentlemen, is a
baseball cap worn backwards with a Nike Swoosh. This is Pyongyang. When that kid gets to be
21 years old they’re going to have a hard time keeping him down on the farm. And so
let me end with saying, you know, “If there are swoosh, there has to be some hope even
for North Korea.” Okay. Thank you ladies and gentlemen.
>>Thank you Sig. Can you come up and ask your questions up here? He has a little bit
of hearing problem, and if you can face him and speak your questions…
>>HECKER: It turns out I have great difficulty hearing especially, you know, I love your
Google wide open environment but they play havoc with my hearing.
>>Okay, so if you could come up, that would be great.
>>So I really enjoyed the talk. I have a question about South Korea and Japan, the
closest neighbors besides China. So, are the experts in South Korea and Japan as informed
as you are or more informed? And what is the official position with respect to the nuclear–what
should be done with respect to the nuclear problem in North Korea?
>>HECKER: Okay. If–I want to make sure that I understand. So first, is what do the experts
in South Korea and Japan as far as the nuclear situation and then what do the governments
think in terms of what should be done? And so, as far as the experts go, it turns out
they have no access and that actually goes for the Chinese. I stopped and talked to the
Chinese every time I go in and out of–out of North Korea, and I talk to their nuclear
people and we compare notes and for the most part the Chinese greatly underestimated the
North Korean capabilities and continue to do so even today. The South Koreans and the
Japanese for the most part just also have very little information. And so, as it turns
out I’m very popular in both countries. You know, I’ve appeared on television shows, they
read all the stuff because it’s one of the few independent things that actually gets
information there. We compare notes, I go to South Korea, I haven’t been to Japan for
a while but people have come and seen me. The analysis–one of the interesting aspects
of doing this sort of track 2 diplomacy–one of the things I like to accomplish with it,
is to get the best possible understanding of the nuclear situation in the hands of the
public. Not only in the hands of the intelligence agencies or the top politicians, so that the
public actually has an understanding of what we’re dealing with and that you get a better
picture out there, instead of having the politicians use it, you know, to twist it in whatever
their own direction is. And so, since they have let me in, I think there’s a much more
uniform appraisal on the highly enriched uranium. There was one very good analyst in Washington
that just published a paper right before I went in, said “suspecting that they had at
least pilot scale [INDISTINCT].” It turns out he was right. But generally we have a
pretty good common understanding and analysis that includes Japan and South Korea. The Russians
and the Chinese have underestimated them but it’s pretty close. As far as the governments
are concerned, the Japanese and I’m just going to, you know, tell it the way it is, have
not very helpful on this–on the North Korean situation. And for the most part is they have
focused on what’s called the “abductees” issue. You know, Kim Jong-Il and his honchos managed
to abduct a number of Japanese years ago and he’s not been willing to fully resolve it
and so every discussion with the Japanese almost starts and ends with the “abductee”
issue. And so, it’s been–the Japanese have been essentially the toughest in the negotiations
because the North Koreans have not come clean on the “abductee” issue. By the way, when
I discussed this with the North Koreans they essentially say, “Look, we have no sympathy
for the Japanese after what they did–after what they did to us,” you know, “in the 40
years of occupation. Who are they to complain?” But so, that’s a big gap. In South Korea,
the previous governments practiced what they call the “Sunshine Policy” and that is to
reach out to the North Koreans and try to figure out a way to sort of move forward,
get them to take some market measures, to help them out a lot, but I think they also
wound up paying off the North Koreans a lot. You know, there are reports that for the one
summit that was held between North and South, that the South actually paid the North Koreans
a lot of money under the table for that. The current government is a very conservative
government and they said, “We’re not paying them under the table anymore.” And so they’ve
played it very tough and so, right now US policy, to a large extent is driven by the
fact that we want to be in locked step with South Korea. South Korea is being very tough
and saying, “We want North Korea to take steps–verifiable steps to its denuclearization before we reengage
them.” And so, as a result–actually, US policy now for the last two years, it’s been termed
strategic patience, it really hasn’t gotten us very far with the North Koreans because
we’ve refused to engaged them directly because they’ve not made any moves towards verifiable
denuclearization. So, I would say Japan and South Korea both are on the side of playing
it slow, making sure that they denuclearize first before we take additional steps.
>>So, with any other technology, I think nuclear weapons will be available to everyone
sooner or later. Why are we so focused on non-proliferation?
>>Let see–no, don’t go away yet I want to make sure that I understand. You’re saying
with all the other weapons and everything that are available?
>>Well, all the technologies that we have in this world like, firearms, it becomes available
to everyone sooner or later, South Korea will come up with its own nuclear bomb and everyone
else will come up with its own nuclear bomb sooner or later when they get smarter or more
technologically advanced. Why are we so focused particularly on non-proliferation and stopping
them from having a bomb? Everyone else in the region have it anyway.
>>HECKER: Oh, okay. Well, the–it’s–you’re essentially asking why are we so focused on
nuclear proliferation as such, right? Because the technology certainly, the knowledge has
spread all over and so the issue then becomes, is the world less safe if more countries have
their finger on the nuclear trigger, as such? If they have nuclear weapons and have their
finger on the nuclear trigger the–there is disagreement. There are some people who say
the world will actually be safer because deterrents works. I personally think that that’s not
the case. I personally think the more countries you have with nuclear weapons, even though
the governments themselves might be more restrained, the fact that you then have both the nuclear
weapons and you have fissile materials, let’s say reasonably ready for nuclear weapons into
more hands does make it a more dangerous place. And particularly, to me, the single biggest
threat is actually not the threat of governments having nuclear weapons or nuclear materials,
but nuclear materials getting out of the hands of governments into the hands of terrorists
where there will be little in terms of deterrents of being able to control the terrorists. So,
I personally still think it’s a good idea to focus very hard on trying to limit the
number of governments having nuclear weapons and having fissile materials. Probably the
best example to give now is, essentially the only place in the world that I think there
is the potential of a nuclear exchange in the, let’s say reasonably near future, five
to ten years, is India and Pakistan. We’d be much better off if India and Pakistan did
not have nuclear weapons. And you know, I can paint the scenario for you, I’ll just
do it quickly because you raised a very important question. India has substantially superior
conventional weapons and a much larger army than Pakistan. Pakistan has supported over
the years a number of terrorist organizations including one that perpetrated the Mumbai
bombing. And if such an episode would happen again, you know, it’s not clear that India
wouldn’t do what the United States did with Afghanistan, is go in and say, “Okay, you
Pakistan if you’re not going to care of your own terrorist organization we’re going to
do it.” And when we do that, the only way that Pakistan might be able to push the Indian’s
back is with nuclear weapons. Pakistan right now is building plutonium reactors–production
reactors in order to make smaller nuclear weapons to repel an Indian attack. And so–and
the Indians are not helping matters either, by saying that they have to develop a submarine
delivered weapon capability for a nuclear weapon. So, when you see that sort of thing
just between two countries, and then if have, you know, a two body problem you change that
to a three or four body problem. I just think the world would be a much more dangerous place
with more nuclear weapons. Yes, whoever–you like to come up? By all means.
>>You said that nuclear weapons in government hands is a little safer than uncontrollable
people hands…>>HECKER: Less danger–less dangerous.
>>Or–yes, right. But do you have any comments on when or what would happen when eventually
North Korea regime collapses?>>HECKER: When the North collapses?
>>Yes.>>HECKER: Okay. Yes, so the question is,
you know, since I had talked about to be–nuclear weapons being in governments hands and not
in government hands. What’s the danger if North Korea collapses? So, I agree. That adds
a substantial danger and that’s also I think one of the reasons why the Chinese actually
do not want that government to collapse. And so, to me when I talk about accidents and
miscalculations as one of the dangers, that’s precisely what I’m talking about. And so,
I would be very concerned at that time if the North Korean regime collapses, if that
collapse isn’t some sort of an orderly process, and most of the time these collapses aren’t,
is what happens to the nuclear weapons? And so, yes, in North Korea right now that’s probably
the single most important danger of the nuclear weapons themselves. So, I–I have no good
answer for that. All I can tell you that is a significant risk.
>>I have two questions to you. First one, is when you meet North Koreans, do you see
a difference of opinion between scientists–civilian scientists and the military? The second question
is where–where are these people educated–the scientists? Are they educated in North Korea?
Are they educated by the previous generation that was educated in Soviet Union? Where are
they educated?>>HECKER: So, the–the first question are
related to the scientists in–in North Korea and let’s say, “Are they strictly military
or are they civilian military?” First of all, I’ve had very limited access to the scientists
and to the people of North Korea. I’ve traveled all over the world. I’ve been to Russia 42
times instead of seven times at in North Korea. I’ve been in Russian homes. I’ve met the scientists.
I’ve been in China. I’ve been in India. In North Korea, I meet no ordinary people. And
the scientists that I’ve met are always in the presence of a handler from–from the–the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so it’s very difficult to draw a good picture. However,
in terms of putting the pieces together, the–and I’ve asked them this question, you know, and
so, I’ve had the interesting discussions. In essence, what the North Koreans do at Yongbyon
is the–the scientists are trained at their universities, not at other universities, Kim
il Sung and [INDISTINCT] and so forth. They trained at their universities, they then bring
them in to Yongbyan and they have a technical institute in the Yongbyan where they continue
to train them further. It’s actually a lot like the Indian model where they bring in
people into—into the Bhabha Atomic Research Center and so forth and then continue to train
them there. And then they stay there, essentially for a lifetime. And–and the mission at Yongbyan
has been a dual purpose mission. They were interested in nuclear energy but the primary
mission all along has been the bomb. And just if you look at the way that they have dealt
with the nuclear complex, for example in terms of their health physics practices, you know,
everything around Yongbyan is just contaminated as can be. Again not–one of the lessons that
one learns with respect to Japan, you know, you know how to measure the most minute amounts
of radioactivity. There’s a lot of the contamination around Yongbyan, hasn’t bothered me going
there because it’s not a health hazard, but it’s a mess. They do that because they feel
they’re at war. So they’re really pushing their nuclear weapons program the most, but
their scientists look at both. And so right now, they have their scientists designing
a light water reactor. So they’re doing civilian stuff. And then their weapons designers, I
have not met any of their specific weapons designers. So, it’s not that different from
an India, from a US program where the civilian and the military, you know, sort of merge
together. In terms of their training it is all in-house, in North Korea.
>>
So, for the pretty pictures that you showed, how much of it is–did you truly trust or
how much was it did you suspect was stage-managed? Like, children talking about the–Thomas Alva
Edison. How much of the pretty pictures that you showed were real or would you suspect
was stage-managed by the regime?>>He’s asking on how realistic do you feel
the pictures are. Do you feel that any other stage by the government they help to [INDISTINCT]?
>>HECKER: I’m sorry, I couldn’t quite understand because my hearing–So–so, what you’re asking–so
I showed you all these photos, so how realistic or representatives are those, right? So, in
Pyongyang is not represented of the rest of North Korea. It’s like going to Moscow and
saying that you saw Russia. You know, there’s so much more to Russia than just Moscow and
it’s the same here. So, first of all, everybody in Pyongyang, you know, tends to be better
off than out in the country side. So, first of all, it’s biased in that direction. I show
all of these photos in order to actually show a contrast to what you normally see on television.
However, I have also been out in the countryside and when you go to Yongbyon, you get out into
the countryside. I have lots of those photos also. I have photos of people–you know individuals
dragging carriage with bricks and concrete on them, you know by hand, of oxen going through
the fields because out in the countryside you have much less equipment. But I’ve have
been out there in their combines and I visited places, I’ve seen people. I visited the city
of Sariwon which is down towards the border, considerable distance away from Pyongyang.
And again, you just look there, you watch and you see, there’s much more activity, there’s
much more industrial activity than you would expect. And so, to answer your question, mine
are slanted towards showing the better side of North Korea. And the news media usually
shows the concentration camps and other things. And the real truth is in between. I think
the main message is–I grew up when I was a child in Austria after the Second World
War, and I grew up living in barracks and we had nothing. But my parents sort of have
figured out, you know, how to live in that environment, and I, as a kid, was the happiest
kid in the whole world. I see a lot of that actually in North Korea. I see the kids playing
soccer, you know, out on the dirt field. That’s what I used to do. So they sort of figure
out. Now the problem is that for the 1990s, they had in addition to being cut-off from
Russia, since they are not getting much help from China, they have devastating floods and
then also droughts. And so the 1990s, the North Korean economy was just decimated, and
that was really a time when they say, you know, perhaps up to a million people starved.
Situation is much better today than it was then and just in the seven years I have gone
there, it’s just improved each time. And so one of the messages is, if we’re waiting for
this regime to fall by itself, it isn’t going to do it very soon. Oh, there’s one more.
>>Hi. Dynastic regime seems to be quite difficult for the West to deal with. I think because
the objectives of their governments are very different from the objectives of our governments,
but it seems a part of the message of what you’ve been saying is that, dealing with Western
democracy in–particularly, presidential democracies is very difficult if you are a country taking
a long term view. Because there can be an election and suddenly all policy change, things
you are relying on are now false. I wonder if you could comment on this. You know, what
things–what the situation is like from the perspective of North Korea having to deal
with the United States?>>HECKER: Sorry. I agree very much with your
comment of just the difficulties of these different systems. You know, not only the
politics but the culture and history. So for example, just for the US to deal with China
on the issue of North Korea, it’s just so different. You know, the Chinese have these
very long term view; they are not bothered by the next election. And the US North Korea
policy, in my opinion, is mostly driven by domestic politics. There are certain things
that we could, and in my opinion, should do which would have us take some risks with the
North Korean, but we can’t to do it because of domestic politics. I actually–another
version of one of my North Korea talks, I actually show what happened in three successive
US administration in terms of North Korea Action and Policy. First was Clinton, then
George W. Bush and now Obama. If you were sitting in the North Korean side and you look
at that and you said, “My God, I don’t know what to do with this Americans.” And that’s
actually what happened. You know, in the Clinton administration, my colleague, Bill Perry,
who was former Secretary of Defense, whom I teach with now at Stanford, he believes
we came within three months of solving the North Korea problem because the Clinton Administration
sort of worked-up through this, and Madeleine Albright actually went to North Korea, met
with Kim Jung-il. President Clinton was scheduled to go to North Korea but time ran out. The
North Korea where then waiting for us to continue that process instead–you know whether you
like Bush administration or not, the fact of the matter is, they thought this agreed
framework was fatally flawed and tried to do everything from the beginning to kill it.
And so North Koreans hang around for about two years, trying to figure out, you know,
when is this stuff going to continue and it didn’t. And so they changed. So then, what’s
interesting, Bush Administration came around the last two years to reach back out to the
North Korean, but the North Korean were playing it sort of, stand back. And then the most
dramatic transition was when the Obama Adminstration came in, I was right there afterwards. We
were expecting the North Koreans, you know, to reach out and in fact as you remember,
President Obama says, “I will reach out my hand if you unclench your fist.” It turns
out they not only clenched their fists but they hit them right between the eyeballs.
And they did a long range missile test and followed with the nuclear test. And so then
they decided after the previous switch of administration, this time they’re not taking
any chances. And so, yes, you’re absolutely right. And, you know, this is where the political
scientists and one of the beauties I should have said of the Center for International
Security and Cooperation at Stanford, is we bring all of these folks together. The nuclear
guys like myself, and people who really understand history, politics and everything which you
have to understand in order to understand nuclear. So, with that thank you ladies and
gentlemen, thanks for your patience.

100 Comments on "What I Saw in North Korea and Why it Matters"


  1. Notice the beginning intro talk: Global warming, climate change, renewable energy, dwindling fossil fuels supplies. That intro was given by a google employee to introduce a guest speaker. There is a caveat at the beginning "The views expressed here are not necessarily the views of google" So what about the views of the person giving the intro talk?

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  2. GOOGLE IS PART OF THE BEAST GET IT SO REMEBER IT BEAST BEAST BEAST DO NOT TRUST GOOGLECIAALCIADA THEY ARE DEATH beast beast BEAST BEAST BEAST

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  3. do not be such a dumb ass muslim ok capitalism builds up that is why u want the US to be yours! hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahhahahahahlolololololololololololololool GOOGLE IS SATAN

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  4. Millions of people go to hospitals in the US, but don't pay or have to pay for those services. Imperialism is when a country takes over another country, which country has the USA taken over. You hate something you know nothing about.

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  5. brain wash kids from age 2 to kill americans their pork belly leaders has brainwashed the whole country and convinced them he is god , i don'r trust them period

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  6. Did you people even read the article about the unicorns? The point of the archeological dig was to prove Pyongyang was the capital or one of them in ancient Korea not that unicorns exist which they didn't claim. Read the article. This is the exact same kind of silly shit as claiming Kim Jong-Il says he invented the hamburger which was just a crazy spin story about the first hamburger restaurant in the DPRK.

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  7. American wants toput the nose in every little thing, people are sick of that. They destroy their reputation doing this…

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  8. Fantastic talk, I really had a loot of very intelligent and useful information from another perspective.

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  9. The true marvel of the Flash Gordon Tower in Pyongyang is that it's able to stand. Raw photos of the interior of the building show crumbling water-damaged concrete that's been exposed to the elements for over 20 years. You don't have to be an architectural engineer to recognize just how structurally unsound that deathtrap is. But gosh that glass facade sure is pretty!

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  10. There are a couple of notable mistakes in the primer on nuclear power:
    1. The natural abundance of Uranium 235 is approximately 0.7%, not 7% as stated
    2. Uranium 235 is not the only fissile isotope of Uranium. Uranium 233 is, for example
    3. Uranium and Plutonium are not the only fissile materials, or the only elements usable in nuclear reactors. Thorium is a counterexample.

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  11. I assume that in this case you're talking about North-Korea, but don't forget your description also fits perfectly for two other countries; Israel and America. Their citizens are also brainwashed from a young age onwards into killing others (Arabs in the case of Israel, anyone that doesn't agree with them in the case of US They're also brainwashed, thinking they're somehow superior to the rest of the planet (Israel claims they're chosen by "god", US thinks it's the greatest country in the world)

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  12. Lets do some theory. Lets say, Theoretically, that North Korea beat South Korea in the Korean war. What do you think now would happen to the people of South Korea? Would it any different than any other war fought? War never changes, at least thats what I think. By definition North Korea is a dictatorship, so if there are no boundaries for the leader, no laws against him, and he had allll the power that the USA has. Now what do we get? A mess…..

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  13. it is your kind of thinking and teaching's that brainwash students into your radical views, I must remind you that you would not be able to put your crap on north korea tv or muslim outlets you would be shot , so it would be a good idea to giveup your American citizenship and get the hell out of America and take your bullshit and other radical views of America with you

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  14. Globalist shills Goggle- New world Order Scum.. get the fuck out of the USA. You belong in the EU, with the rest of the elites.. I bet you people love Eugenics at goggle, GMO's. Deratives.. Go away NWO scum

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  15. his crap is as bad as what you here from NK…….global warming……the biggest rip off in the history of mankind.

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  16. I started to watch, and I* though I could learn something, but as soon as these elite progressives start on global warming, I know they are dishonest, and they think people are stupid, well I guess thats true.

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  17. this man is what you call a collaborator. if there is a war, he will support our enemies and if they invade he will be given a position of leadership. Look up Neville Chamberlain.

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  18. hey you got visa card welcome to theUSA!, no visa go starve!,is the impression billions get.The US establishment can be like N.Korea in reverse. Switzerlands cooperative democracy& to a certain extent Venezuela& Germany work better.Its not easy being world policeman,why make it hard?

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  19. i started my eco fake business after watching this. oil is dead only there is more of it in america than any coutry

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  20. Countries which were allies of the US became involved in the Korean War because the USSR was not present at the Security Council meeting and the US pushed a resolution thru.The US had installed Synman Rhee as a dictator in the South and had refused to hold election in all of Korea as they knew that Kim il Sung would win as he was a national hero and his followers were the only Koreans who fought the Japanese occupation. The US dropped plague infected fleas on NK in 1952 and should compensate

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  21. lol "freedom" in the U.S ??? ok then if getting searched at an airport regardless of your age (including babies) is what you call freedom then good luck to you moron! and habeas corpus hahahahaha you have to be joking?? civil peaceful protesters being labeled guilty of a crime (mass assembly) get beaten,tear gassed and pepper sprayed ??? thats habeas corpus alright..oh and you dont have freedoms go and look up what form of government you are ruled by and study its power system!!…

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  22. Tell that to a starving North Korean you stupid fuck, they don't have any hospitals, they don't have any social security. You people are so determined to make yourself a victim. If America sucks so much and North Korea is so great, fucking move there.

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  23. Wonderful Report. It shows hope for those struggling people. However I;m very sceptical about what you saw and weather or not things were planned for you to see.

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  24. Don't think all Americans are like these stupid fucks.

    They are just self centered ass holes who are spoiled. They are probably pissed off that their daddy didn't buy them the iPhone 5 and now they are ass hurt about it. So they run around calling the US oppressive.

    All these idiots are in a small minority in America, remember it is the dumb asses who speak the most.

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  25. Shut up you little brat.

    You have no idea how freaking lucky you are to live in the United States! You think North Koreans can just walk down the street and buy an entire meal for 4$? NO! They can't!

    In America if you get to violent in a protest the police will pepper spray you, in North Korea you get sent to a labor camp.

    In America the government is trying to ban assault rifles, in North Korea you can't even afford a knife… unless your family has someone who is high up in the government.

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  26. Lol, I know, I lived in the US for years and went to American international schools for most of my childhood, its weird, I'm normally the one railing against your government in YouTube videos. I try to be fair and I always believe in giving credit where credit is due so having lived in the US as well as lots of really shitty countries, hearing ungrateful wastes of space talking like that makes me bloody angry.

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  27. It's interesting that maybe US went to N Korea in a belligerent mood because of 9/11 and that's what motivated the N Koreans to develop nukes.

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  28. If I were North Korean, I'd be more offended that the world had let a family of Marxist pigs like the Kims ruin my life, and the lives of everyone I ever knew.

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  29. How is this related to what I was saying? Sorry if I offended you. I agree that North Korean people are oppressed and deserve freedoms found in the US such as the right to vote, and the right to speak freely.

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  30. Wasn't trying to offend you or respond to offense. It's just that the Kims do whatever they like, whenever they like, within whatever means they have at their disposal. For example, they've been counterfeiting US and South Korean currency for decades now.

    I was simply saying that the North Koreans (and everyone else outside of North Korea) would be better off if someone would be so kind as to put a bullet in the brain of every family member in the North Korean line of leadership. That's all.

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  31. If I were from Haiti, I'd be more offended that the U.S. had let a family of Capitalist pigs like the Duvaliers ruin my life, and the lives of everyone I ever knew.

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  32. In Haiti, children look for food in waste dumps. I am sure they are much happier then if they had to go to Kimdergarten.

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  33. If you took someone from Camden, New Jersey to N Korea, they would think they were in a paradise. You can find a few videos about Camden right here on YouTube.

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  34. If you were a Haitian, you'd blame everything in the world on the US, including bad weather. If the US came to depose Duvalier, you'd fight the Americans to protect him – which might be a big reason why we never bothered, and were right not to do so, if our ill-fated aid to Aristide is any guide.

    As for Duvalier, didn't he claim to have killed President Kennedy with a voodoo curse? And don't you have to have something better than a barter economy to be called "capitalist?"

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  35. Just wondering if you've watched the video "Noam Chomsky talks about Haiti ". If you do get around to watching it it would be interesting to know would you change your thoughts re: Haitians.

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  36. The only thing Noam Chomsky has ever been able to demonstrate to me is how morally bankrupt Leftist spokesmen are. It's akin to citing Dr. Joseph Goebbels as an authority on Hebrew culture.

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  37. He's not insane at all. He's just completely unscrupulous. Thus why he is a socialist millionaire harping on the evils of rich Americans (and getting a hefty speaker's fee every time he does it). The sanity of his fans, however, is another matter entirely.

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  38. U def an appropriate username. I'm not interested in left/right just the truth, and i'd rather listen to an research a respected academic rather than 'some geezer with a bee in his bonnet off of youtube'

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  39. Thanks for the info, one for the reading list on holiday. I'm not sure what to expect after reading the only one star rating on Amazon "This is an object lesson in 19th century racism and cultural ignorance. There really is no more to say about it. You will learn a lot about the bias of a white Anglophone American and nothing about Haiti. " .

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  40. Right. You aren't interested in left/right, only the truth, so you've decided to draw your knowledge base on a notorious Leftist hypocrite who has a long and established track record of lying.

    I must admit though, if you're one of those "blame everything on the Yanks" OWS/ISO characters, you couldn't do much better than Noam Chomsky. And from your incongruently smarmy support for this notorious Leftist shill, I expect you're as full of shit as he is.

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  41. The problem is that Leftist horseshit is what JN is looking for. Everything else is "19th century racism and cultural ignorance," so we can safely assume he's entirely insulated himself from anything that might disturb that Marxist narrative. Just selling product at this point.

    Some of these chucklenuts will even support the North Korean government in their unguarded moments. It's like meeting characters straight out of an Orwellian dystopia. They're a dime a dozen at socialist protest parties.

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  42. Not necessarily. Marxists are notorious hypocrites, and when they turn to fascism the system can become quite viable. Mind, the working people are treated like slaves and are worked mercilessly for the profit of the Leftist exploiter elite, but if the nomenklatura let the peasants keep a small portion of their earnings and give them a chance to buy their way into the elite, a system like this can become quite stable. The PRC is a good example.

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  43. I'm not an academic or researcher, I 'draw knowledge' from a variety of sources, i don't necesrily cross ref everytng.The video I was referring to -supported by a Haitian grp, I reserchd the speakers credentials impressive.So,shld i take the word of anon Dr.CRuel, who has anger/hate issues or Chomsky. Unless your a recgnsed academic or you have the balls to hve a public debate on the subject with the person u so vilify; I'd suggest you do meditate/yoga & release that inner hatred.

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  44. Horseshit. This isn't a documentary called "Local Haitians talk about Haiti." It's "Noam Chomsky talks about Haiti." I am being sold a line by a Leftist lying about his credentials and ideological bearings.

    You expressed your disinterest in my opinion; I return the favor, doubly so because of your obnoxiousness and clear dishonesty. Go peddle your ideological produce somewhere else.

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  45. U focus on 1 part of my coment & ignore the rest.n e way,i reviw'd the vid,yes,u are right,it was a church.I';try & sumrise my main point.There is a mass of info online,i dont want to waste time with opinions frm evry tom dick& sally,so,I filter i regard as trusted sources.An academic frm a respcted institution,(in this case)organised grups eg Haitian action comitte corrobrates info frm chomsky & sme intersting boks frm cambridge uni press.I'm not going to write off people based on rants online.

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  46. I should also add Ihad no intention of being dishonest or obnoxious, you seem to think feel the worst. I wld also advise that you cnnot always detect intentions / malice based on500 charcs or less. I hope your able just chill out a bit na dnot let you blood boil so muvch.

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  47. Yes you did, and you seem entirely comfortable on speculating as to mine. And it's not a matter of "boiling blood" – just facts based on Chomsky's long record of shameless Leftist shilling.

    If there's anyone who has a right to be infuriated by this propagandist and charlatan, it's Sophal Ear. You should read what he has to say about Chomsky – but then again, like I said, I'm pretty sure you already know what I'm talking about.

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  48. Yup, that's right. All it takes for me to sniff out bullshit. I've heard this same song and dance countless times before, so now it only takes me a few notes to recognize it.

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  49. i dont want to get panto, but no, i didn't… i'm not evn sure what the point oif this is. I will look up Sophal at sme point but in any event i think it v. unlikely that Chomsky i sthis 'Dr Cruel' type villain u wnt to portray. He's obviously said something that u strongly disagree with or feel uncomfortable with. Anywy, its bbenn an experience ! over and out.

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  50. No. Chomsky has said very many things over years and years of pontificating that have been wrong, contradictory and/or deliberately deceitful and malicious. And the "DrCruel" moniker comes from insults I received at McSpotlight, where I was called "cruel and insensitive" for pointing out their errors in fact (which I found out over time were often intentional). Being a Leftist and a deliberate liar seem to comfortably go together.

    And you're right. It's pointless to continue this exchange.

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  51. Thomas Jefferson, and other racist slave owners, kept the United States from recognizing Haiti until 1862. The U.S. slave owners presented the racist argument that Haiti's devastating economic decline was an example of what happens when Africans govern themselves. You are not the only racist propagating this idea.

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  52. I don't think, that guy is really know what is going on. The West can bomb the North Korean easy. but they will bomb Seoul. In the North they so fucked up and brain washed, sorry to say, but just let them die. No help with food, no help with business, isolate them completely. Its making my heard bleeding, but its the only way to stop the camps over there…

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  53. Thank you for your video, read show more, why we put video, it old and before 2011, it intresting to hear this from him, see how we have been open in the DPRK for many years, and lissen well what he says. he is very intresting.

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  54. What this speaker fails to notice is just how choreographed and orchestrated the things he sees in the NK are. Just look at any testimony from refugees and they will tell you how much the regime lies to tourists.

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  55. The last question was made by a person with no history knowledge, someone who maybe trust the tv too much. He started saying "dinastic regimes seem to be quite difficult to the west to deal with" If dinastic means not democratic read please.

    Look at history, nnon- democratic regimes have been mostly supported by western governments since ww2, starting with Franco at spain who was not deposed for "trade-stability reasons" and was helped to win the spanish civil war with more than 12.000 ford trucks, there are declasified documents that shows that explaining the reasons ( the spanish repulic was a government elected y the people). Followed by Salazar in portugal being one of the original members of the NATO/OTAN for "strategic reasons of the azores islands" Continuing with the king of Arabia Saudi as well (don´t remember his name because it is not my native language and im not used to them). Mubarak on egipt some data say US has given more than 1.3 Billion dolars in economic and military support over 30 years. Saddam Hussein before the gulf war while he was behaving as a "well trained pet" for "petrol reasons", as soon as his decissions were not stable and did not followed US orders the relationship went wrong but before US helped Saddam regime more than many other "non dinastic countries" and this can be easily checked. Then you can watch Fulgencio Batista on Cuba "because they are our neighbours and economical interest like gamblin tourism and others. General Pinochet loans even after an embassator Orlando Letelier was killed. And you can continue checking almost any other latin american dictator appart from Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez who did not behaved as "well trained pets" (they were 2 of them at the same time with a lot of natural resources and massive popular support, they weren´t the tanks the ones that kept them at the power over the years as most of the other dictators are, those two didn´t need any foreign support to keep the power, no need to be a pet). You can continue checking because there are a lot more.

    It seems western culture has supported most of the non- democratic governments because of, amongst other things, that long term plan and stability dictators have, because they are really good for trade (lots of cheap workers with bad conditions, cheap natural resources expoliated, no strikes or walkouts and only one person can move the country`s commercial balance, high taxes and no social care if needed, they will always pay the pulic debt and totally control the emission of it) Doesn´t matter how much people starve because the one man and his close friends are warm and well fed at home. As you said they are not worried of next elections, an ally that is ready to screw his own country to keep the power is a good ally if the dictator knows he needs the other western countries to keep it. All the western countries know that but they won´t tell on tv that they are helping a dictator that is starving his own people to death and killing people without trial for the western economical interests. 

    Sorry about my english, it is not my native language. Also thanks for the video, amazing talk of the bomb guy, amazing questions and amazing answers appart from that last one (loved that one questioning about how well the pics represent north korea and his answer). Really interesting, Thanks

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  56. NK is one big prison and one big cult where the people live in fear and the leader is like Hitler..Its very sad..Everyone pray for the people of NK..

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  57. 59.10: "when that kid turns 21 they're gonna have a hard time keeping him down [on the farm]" ……. But from age 17 to age 27 they are in military service (and after that they need to marry and get start a life….) so I guess they got that one covered.

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  58. At least if every country was like north korea we probably would not have a global warming problem!

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  59. Why Israel, India, Pakistan, China have the right have Atomic bomb and not N Korea.
    US stopped the election between North and South Vietnam has killed millions of innocent Vietnamese 

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  60. "NK build these ALL BY THEM SELVES"
    Why does he put so much emphasis on this lol, how does he know for sure?

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  61. Some who visit Pyongyang just eat up all the propaganda & the absolute bull$hit facade the DPRK wants you to believe on their cultish tour.Pyongyang is pretty much just one BIG ass Jones town

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  62. The last segment is simply awful. Doesn't he realize that those nice swimming pools, libraries and software labs are not accessible to real Koreans but staged propaganda for foreigners like him. Especially hilarious is that he believed the  spontaneous desire of the textile worker to listen to american rock … Real life in North Korea is probably close to a nazi concentration camp (minus the gas chambers). How can he be so naive ??!!!
    Well, he is a scientist and a leftist liberal … 

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  63. 1:02:02–1:02:07 they had at least pilots (inaudible) scale.  Is this another technical error by the google team, or was it intentionally censored?

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  64. As usual, what the US government does is purely for the financial benefit of the warfare complex. The US government knows the North Koreans will never use their nuclear weapons because that will mean the end of the regime and yet the US government pretends that the North Koreans will use nuclear weapons and the aim of the US government is to   keep the American people in constant fear.  US defense contractors and their puppet politicians constantly exaggerate the threat of the enemy, so that
     the American public are too afraid to notice
     hundreds of billions being borrowed every year from places like China which will inevitably lead to financial disaster for America.
     US defense contractors get a big slice of the 1.1-1.4 trillion dollars spent on so-called defense every year (base DOD budget plus other national security programs plus the interest on the debt from past unnecessary wars ).
     The US government spends more on defense than all the world's defense budgets put together.
     By borrowing hundreds of billions a year in order to maintain the US government's worldwide military empire, the inevitable bankruptcy of the US government will happen when
     the annual interest on the national debt exceeds a trillion dollars a year .
     WHEN THE INEVITABLE BANKRUPTCY HAPPENS,
     the best we can hope for is the Union remains intact and powers go back to the states as it was before the Civil War while
     there will be drastic cuts in essential government services like food/water/environmental safety and
     tens of millions of Americans will have their net worth drastically reduced due to the US government defaulting on its US bond debt obligations.

     To prevent the bankruptcy of our government, the financial disaster to US bond holding Americans, drastic cuts in essential government services like food/water/environmental safety and
     for a comprehensive peace agreement with North Korea that defense contractors will not be happy with and
     that is different from the peace agreement made between President Reagan and the Islamists in Soviet Afghanistan,
     copy/paste the following into your google search box:

     " Brian Boatman PART ONE: 911 ATTACKS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED "

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  65. dangsin-ui saekki AE, naneun beulajil ojeon-ui eongdeong-iei tongtonghan mulgeon-eul chan-yang jungjihaja naneun dangsin-ege baboleul bil-eo meog-eul almom-i hana-e geol-eo yeobgi tta, dangsin-eun homo yeos jibang geosigileul gajigoissneun salam-i mwongaleul malhal geosbogo sip-eun geos

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